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The 1918 Reform Act, Redistribution and 
Scottish Politics 
Ewen A. Cameron 
University of Edinburgh 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of the 1918 Representation of the People Act on 
Scottish politics. It notes the extensive addition to the electorate with the 
enfranchisement of adult males and most women over the age of thirty years. The 
main focus of the article is on the effect of the provisions of the Act in terms of 
redistribution of seats in Scotland. Although the overall level of Scottish 
representation stayed the same, at seventy seats, there was a profound shift from 
the rural areas of the north and south of Scotland to the industrial areas of west 
central Scotland and the city of Glasgow, which was awarded a further eight seats. 
In addition, the majority of the ‘Districts of Burghs’, a legacy of the Union of 1707, 
were abolished. It is argued that these changes created new political conditions in 
Scotland that favoured the Labour party over the inter-war period, and especially in 
the 1920s. The arguments – economic, historical and political – deployed in defence 
of seats scheduled for abolition by the Boundary Commission are analysed. 
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Although the features of the Scottish political landscape of the inter-war period are 
fairly clear in the conventional interpretation – Liberal demise, Labour breakthrough, 
Unionist consolidation – the nature of the process which lay behind the demolition of 
the former pattern of Liberal dominance was complex.1 The expansion of the 
Scottish electorate from 760,000 in 1910 to 2.2 million in 1918 gave politics a greater 
claim to the description ‘democratic’ and laid the foundations of many aspects of our 
modern political system.2 The increase was greatest in urban industrial areas, where 
the expansion was of the order of 250 per cent. The achievement of full adult male 
enfranchisement in the Representation of the People Act 1918 may have had a 
disproportionate effect on Scotland since the level of enfranchisement prior to 1918 
had been lower.3 The impact of full adult male enfranchisement was less evident in 
the 1918 election than in later contests due to the low turnout. The enfranchisement 
of most women (around 80 per cent) over the age of thirty added a new factor to 
elections. The retention of property qualifications for this class of voters, their 
definition in relation to their husbands and discrimination against unmarried women 
were regressive features and probably favoured the established parties rather than 
Labour. These problems were dealt with in 1928 when full adult female 
enfranchisement was granted.4  
 
As well as the extension of the franchise in 1918 and 1928, there was significant 
redistribution. This was a crucial element of the new system as the determination of 
the number of voters in each constituency in establishing the equal value of votes.5 
In geographical terms, the beneficiary was Glasgow – which acquired a further eight 
seats – and the central lowlands. These changes disadvantaged the Liberal party, as 
almost all of the thirteen seats which were abolished had a Liberal history, and 
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favoured Labour.6 This article will develop this theme and look in detail at the way in 
which the redistribution elements of the 1918 Reform Act changed the political 
landscape of Scotland. In a number of places there was a feeling that the 
government had introduced these changes without sufficient consultation and that 
the midst of the war was not the most appropriate time to bring in such a major 
reform of the electoral system.7 Attention will be given to the arguments that were 
used in the debates around these changes and, in particular, there will be a focus on 
the reduction of the number of the Districts of Burghs constituencies, especially in 
the Highland and Borders regions of Scotland. 
 
If we divide the country into five electoral regions and compare the pattern in 1918 
with that in 1885, we can see the shift which took place. 
 
Regional distribution of Scottish constituencies, 1885 and 1918. 
Number of seats Percentage of seats 
1885 1918  1885  1918 
North East  10   9  14.2  12.6 
Highlands      9   6  12.9     8.4 
Western  23 32  32.8  45.0 
Eastern  19 20  27.1  28.2 




The table shows a shift in representation from the rural to the urban, from the west to 
the east, and from both southern and northern Scotland to the central industrial belt. 
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Gordon Brown has argued that this meant that the ‘electoral geography of Scotland 
… was for the first time dominated by working-class constituencies’.8 This also 
brought representation into line with population to a greater extent than ever before. 
The redistribution of 1918 was conducted according to entirely different principles 
from that of 1885.9 There was a much clearer assumption of popular representation 
now that there was full male enfranchisement and most women over the age of thirty 
were able to vote.  
 
The Boundary Commissioners, who had the task of drawing the new electoral map 
of the UK, were enjoined to create seats with at least 50,000 people but also to pay 
attention to recognised administrative boundaries.10 The Districts of Burghs were 
profoundly reorganised and reduced in number from thirteen to six, as shall be 
discussed below.  
 
The first instruction contained a threat to the representation of rural Scotland but the 
latter provided some comfort. There might well have been a temptation among 
Unionists, who dominated the coalition government, to apply the rules in a rigorous 
manner given the recent electoral history of areas such as the highlands. 
Interestingly, Sir George Younger, the Chairman of the Conservative Party and 
former Scottish Whip, made a plea for a relaxed application of the population formula 
in the highlands. He tried to give the impression that this was contrary to his own 
party interest, in that the highlands had a radical history. Lying behind this apparent 
generosity of spirit, however, lay political calculations. Younger may have been 
worried that reducing highland representation in favour of the industrial lowlands 
could benefit the Labour Party. Further, he used older ideas of representation to 
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make his argument. He argued that ‘we ought to deal with areas with their 
characteristics and we ought to deal with historical and separate interests and so 
on’.11 This was a conservative argument against popular representation. There were 
also voices arguing against the application of the arithmetical principle of 
representation.12 Arguments in favour of a new constituency for the Western Isles, 
for example, were expressed in terms of its remoteness from the political centre in 
London and the special economic and social problems of the islands.13 Although the 
electorate in the new seat created there in 1918 was small – with only 18,000 voters 
(out of a total population of around 60,000 according to the 1911 Census) – it had 
greater geographical coherence and improved the quality of representation of the 
islands, which had formerly been divided between Inverness-shire (Harris, North 
Uist, Benbecula, South Uist, Barra) and Ross and Cromarty (Lewis).  The Boundary 
Commissioners justified this recommendation with reference to ‘the character of the 
constituency and the pursuits of the islanders’.14  
 
This redistribution was at least as important as the extension of the franchise. The 
pattern of representation in Scotland was altered profoundly. The pre-war system 
had left urban industrial Scotland, where most of the population resided, 
considerably under-represented, and the rural fringes of the country over-
represented. This was a pattern which went back to 1832, and even to 1707, and the 
anomalies had not been fully dealt with in the nineteenth century, even by the major 
redistribution which took place in 1885.15 The redistribution of 1918 went a 
considerable way to resolving these issues. because it changed the electoral map of 
Scotland in a way which clearly benefitted the Labour party by increasing the number 
of seats in the geographical area of their greatest strength and diminishing the 
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number of seats in the rural fringes of Scotland where they had little support. The 
results of this change were more clearly seen clearly at the 1922 election. In that 
contest Labour, won 19 of its 29 seats in western Scotland. Nearly half (48.1 per 
cent according to the 1921 Census) of the electorate was located there and Labour’s 
share of the vote was 44.1 per cent in this region. The new electoral geography 
seemed to favour the Labour Party, at least in the 1922 election. 
 
In the 32 seats of the industrial region of West Central Scotland the Labour party 
developed for the first time an electoral heartland in Scotland. This was not 
immediately evident in 1918 as the party won only six seats (Aberdeen North, 
Edinburgh Central, Glasgow Govan, South Ayrshire, West Fife, Hamilton). The 
factors that produced this result were all temporary. They included the defective 
register, the disenfranchisement of many serving soldiers, the resulting low turn out; 
and the jingoistic appeal of the Coalition government.16 In comparison to other 
industrial cities in Britain it has been argued that ‘Glasgow undoubtedly did swing 
further to Labour in these years than other British cities, and retained its high degree 
of Labour loyalty through the inter-war years’. In 1922, an election more 
representative of the general trends of the period, Labour won nearly 42 per cent of 
the vote; only Sheffield with 42.5 per cent topped that and many English industrial 
cites returned a much lower Labour vote. In Manchester, for example, it was 35 per 
cent, Leeds 26.5 per cent and Liverpool 25 per cent.17 In 1918 the Unionists won ten 
seats in Glasgow as part of the Coalition. Left to their own devices in 1922 (and it is 
worth remembering that Scottish MPs were keen to sustain the Coalition) they won 
only four.18 They did a little better in 1924, adding Partick and Maryhill to the 
prosperous seats in the south and west of the city in which they tended to do well, 
 
7 
but prior to the onset of renewed coalition politics in 1931, they remained a minority 
among Glasgow MPs. In the four elections of the 1920s, after the demise of the 
Coalition and prior to the split of 1931 and the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932, they 
won 38 out of the sixty contests in Glasgow, the Unionists won 21 and the Liberals 
only a single seat – Partick in 1922. This last point is a telling one. There was a 
strong Liberal tradition in Glasgow, in 1885 the party had taken all seven of the city’s 
seats and performed strongly in 1906 and in both 1910 elections, although Liberal 
Unionism was a significant force in the West of Scotland.19 By the election of 1922 
the party was pushed to the geographical peripheries of Scotland in the Highlands 
and other rural areas.20 In the industrial west outside Glasgow, where there were 17 
seats after 1918 the picture was more mixed. There were some seats, such as 
Hamilton, South Ayrshire, Bothwell, Coatbridge and the surviving Dumbarton District 
of Burghs, where Labour dominated; another group of seats (North Lanarkshire, 
Rutherglen and West Renfreshire) where they did very well and overall Labour won 
39 out of the 68 contests in the 1920s. There were other seats where the picture was 
more varied: North Ayrshire and the Ayr District of Burghs were solid Unionist seats; 
Greenock and Paisley retained Liberal members in the 1920s and Motherwell, 
returning Tory and Communist, as well as Labour, MPs in the inter-war period was in 
a category of its own.21 
 
Another key element of the context in which the 1918 election was fought was the 
fact that the franchise was radically altered compared to December 1910. In the pre-
war period, only around 60 per cent of adult males – and substantially fewer in the 
poorer urban areas – were able to vote.22 After the extension of the franchise in 1918 
all adult males were able to vote, as were most women over the age of thirty.  
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Although the overall level of enfranchisement of women was roughly the same in 
Scotland (79.2 per cent) as in England (79.5 per cent), women were enfranchised on 
a slightly different basis. In Scotland it was a householder franchise or a tenancy of 
non-domestic property of at least £5 annual rental value. The system worked against 
domestic servants who lived with their employers. There were interesting variations 
in the extent to which the electorate in particular seats was female and the proportion 
of females who were enfranchised across the Scottish constituencies. Some seats, 
such as towns dominated by the textile industries, had higher levels of females in the 
population but relatively low levels of female enfranchisement because the system 
disenfranchised single, unmarried working women (who were less frequently 
occupiers of a dwelling house) constituted a relatively large proportion of the 
electorate in such towns. There was a direct contrast with towns based on 
engineering, metal working or coal mining, where there were relatively few economic 
opportunities for women. The consequence in these cases was that single females 
over the age of thirty and in employment were fewer than in textile towns and a 
higher proportion of the women over the age of 30 were married and more likely to 
qualify as voters.23  
 
Another key issue in considering the 1918 Reform Act in the Scottish context is the 
extent to which grievances about the extent as well as the geography of Scottish 
representation emerged in the debate. This stemmed from the way in which the 
Boundary Commissioners charged with the duty of redrawing the boundaries were 
operating. The number of Irish seats was to remain unaltered and the overall number 
of seats in Britain was originally intended to remain largely the same. Beyond this, 
however, there was no reference to Scotland. The Commissioners were working on 
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the assumption that 50,000 was the minimum population level for a Parliamentary 
seat. Strict application of this rule would have created some seats of very large area 
in rural parts of Scotland, not only in the Highlands but also in the Borders.24 An 
English MP, James Mason (who sat for Windsor) succeeded with an amendment to 
the instructions to the Boundary Commissioners to give them flexibility in order that 
redistribution did not create constituencies of ‘inconvenient size and character’. After 
the redistribution was complete, Scotland had seven of its 71 constituencies below 
the 50,000 threshold, compared to 10 out of 485 in England.25 This gave the nature 
of Scottish politics in the post-1918 period a quite distinctive character, but the 
alternative would have been some huge seats that would have been virtually 
impossible to represent. The peripheries of Scotland, where most of these seats 
were located in the period after 1918, tended to have a different electoral history 
from the central belt. Over the course of the twentieth century, most Liberal or 
Scottish National Party representation was outside of the central belt. This could be 
seen as late as October 1974, when the two main parties received quite a low 
combined vote and the SNP gained 31.4 per cent of the vote. Most of the eleven 
seats that they gained were outside the central belt, but they racked up large 
numbers of votes in central Scotland without gaining any seats. The history of 
Scottish Liberal representation has also been largely confined to these smaller seats. 
This, however, masks the fact that this ‘periphery’ was much smaller than it had 
been prior to 1918 and this, also, had a profound effect on Scottish electoral history, 
as shall be discussed below. 
 
One scholar has detected the articulation of ‘nationalistic arguments’ by Liberal and 
Labour MPs who argued for sustained or increased numbers of Scottish MPs when 
 
10 
the case could not be made on ‘democratic’ grounds.26 Reviewing the technical 
debates around the appointment of the Boundary Commissioners, a range of broad 
issues emerge. Principal among them was one of the longest running debates in 
modern Scottish politics, the extent of Scotland’s representation in the House of 
Commons and the role of the Scottish MPs. Eugene Wason, the MP for 
Clackmannan and Kinross, argued that there were dangers that if Scottish seats 
were reduced there could be a growing perception that the Union was not working to 
Scotland’s best advantage: 
 
We are a separate nationality, we have our own system of laws, our own 
education system, and our own marriage laws. In Scotland the sexes are 
equal, and, as a matter of fact, we are constantly getting rebuked by our 
constituents that we do not act like the Irish party, and then they say we might 
be able to do something for Scotland. I am not one of those who want to see 
an independent Scottish party in this House in the same sense as there is an 
independent Irish party, nor do I begrudge Ireland its separate representation. 
But in Scotland we feel we are, and have been, somewhat severely 
neglected.27  
 
Wason was a supporter of Home Rule for Scotland and some of the MPs who 
supported him in his amendment to ensure that there was not reduction in the 
number of Scottish MPs were members of the Young Scots Society. One of these, 
James Mylne Hogge, probably spoiled the case made by his colleague by arguing in 
an aggressive way that Scotland was always badly treated by the House of 
Commons and that the issue of Scottish representation could not be dealt with until 
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Scotland received its own parliament. He assumed that if a Scottish Parliament was 
established, then that would end Scottish representation at Westminster. When Sir 
George Younger exclaimed ‘Heaven forbid’, Hogge replied: 
 
what we want is a Parliament in Scotland for our own affairs. If you give us 
that, we do not care a straw how many members come to Westminster. You 
can get rid of us altogether if you give us a Parliament of our own to deal with 
Scottish affairs.28 
 
This is an issue that has echoed through every debate that has touched on the idea 
of Scottish home rule. It is mostly known today as the West Lothian question, after 
the constituency of the late Tam Dalyell, who articulated it incessantly in the debates 
over devolution in the 1974–9 period. Even in 1918, however, the question was not 
new, and it had figured in debates over Gladstonian Home Rule schemes in the 
1880s and 1890s. As a devolutionist, Hogge was unusual in answering the question 
so unequivocally and in assuming that Scottish MPs would withdraw from 
Westminster in the eventuality of a Parliament being established in Edinburgh. He 
deprecated the ‘arithmetical’ approach to the settlement of the representation 
question and argued that if some Scottish seats were to be sacrificed in the 
redistribution, then the University seats were prime candidates for abolition. He 
called them ‘undemocratic’ and argued that the members who were elected for these 
seats were unrepresentative of Scotland.29 Arguments were put forward to defend 
the relative over-representation of Scotland in the House of Commons at this time: 
the distance from the centre of power in London, the sparsely-populated nature of 
some of the constituencies, and the dangers inherent in reducing the representation 
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of the rural and agricultural areas in favour of the urban industrial areas. These 
points will be pursued in more depth later in this article through consideration of the 
redistribution in the Highland and the Borders regions of Scotland. 
 
It is interesting that the major reform that took place in 1918 has not attracted the 
same attention as the acts of 1832, 1868 and 1884-85.30 In many ways the electoral 
landscape was changed more profoundly in 1918 than on these earlier occasions. 
Scotland’s system of representation went back to the Union of 1707 and although 
the extent of Scottish representation in the House of Commons was extended from 
45 members then to the 70 seats that existed in December 1910 at the last election 
before the Great War, there were many continuities. Except for the addition of 
university seats in 1868, the essential structure of representation remained the 
same: the historic Scottish counties were represented, although some of them were 
divided in 1868 and 1885; the Scottish burghs were represented, sometimes in 
groups or ‘Districts’; although the larger ones – Glasgow and Edinburgh, for example 
– were divided into constituencies of roughly equal size.31 There were strong links 
here with the historic local administrative entities of Scotland. Some of these 
‘Districts’ were quite coherent and composed of small Burghs that were reasonably 
close together. The Leith District included Leith, Portobello and Musselburgh, all on 
the coast near Edinburgh. Others, however, were very different. The Ayr District, for 
example, included Ayr and Irvine, both in Ayrshire, and Campeltown, Inveraray and 
Oban, situated across the large Highland county of Argyll. Even taking into account 
the extent to which an MP was expected to be present in his constituency in this 
period this seat would have presented a challenge.  In 1918 the sitting MP was  Sir 
George Younger, and during the debates on the bill he described this seat as being 
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‘divided by the Atlantic’ and talked of the competing, even antagonistic, interests of 
the different burghs, especially around the fishing industry.32 The Wick District of 
Burghs, represented by the Secretary for Scotland, Robert Munro, stretched from 
Cromarty on the ‘Black Isle’, just north of Inverness, through Dingwall and Tain in the 
eastern part of Ross-shire, to Wick in the northerly county of Caithness and then to 
Kirkwall, the main town in Orkney. Other seats were composed of more closely-
situated burghs, but were simply awkward in other ways. This was true, for example, 
of the Stirling District, which was composed of the two major, but very different, 
towns of Stirling and Dunfermline, together with the smaller burghs of Culross, 
Inverkeithing and South Queensferry which were spread across the north and south 
banks of the Forth. The politics of this seat, represented from 1868 to 1908 by Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal Party leader from 1898 to 1908, presented 
difficulties in that the Liberals in Dunfermline, which had a radical tradition, behaved 
very differently from their counterparts in Stirling. This was resolved in 1918 when 
Stirling and Dunfermline were each made the centre of new Districts of Burghs.  
 
The Boundary Commissioners working assumptions posed a very severe threat to 
the Scottish Districts of Burghs, although some press comment argued that their 
disappearance would ‘occasion no regret’ this was an issue of some significance.33 
The Commissioners conceded that any burgh with a population of more than 70,000 
should survive and that a two-member burgh (a single constituency electing two 
MPs, such as  Dundee) should not be divided or lose members if it had a population 
of more than 120,000. They aimed to reorganise the Burgh Districts so that all the 
Burghs in a District were in the same county. Where Districts were abolished, the 
Burghs were included in their surrounding county; for example, Dingwall was 
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absorbed into Ross-shire. The outcome was the reduction of the number of the 
Districts constituencies from 13 to six, and the creation of more logical and 
geographically-coherent groupings. 
DISTRICT Constituent Burghs 
AYR Ayr, Ardrossan, Irvine. Prestwick, Saltcoats, Troon 
DUMBARTON Dumbarton, Clydebank 
DUNFERMLINE Dunfermline, Cowdenbeath, Inverkeithing, Lochgelly 
KIRKCALDY 
Kirkcaldy, Buckhaven, Methil, Burntisland, Dysart, 
Kinghorn 
MONTROSE Montrose, Arbroath, Brechin, Forfar, Inverbervie 
STIRLING Stirling, Falkirk, Grangemouth 
 
There was a strong electoral implication in this change. In the thirteen pre-1918 
Districts, there had been a strong tradition of Liberal voting; in December 1910, only 
the Ayr District was held by the Conservatives and the St Andrews District by the 
Liberal Unionists (and the latter had been Liberal as recently as January 1910). The 
absorption by East Fife of the St Andrews District was a significant factor in Asquith’s 
defeat in 1918, although the county seat was won by Liberals or National Liberals at 
each inter-war election with the exception of a Unionist victory in 1924.34 All of the 
others were represented by Liberals, although Leith Burghs was gained by a 
Conservative in a by-election in 1914. However, of the six surviving Districts, in 1918 
Ayr was held by the Conservatives, another four seats were held by Lloyd George 
Liberals and only one seat, Stirling, was won by an Independent Liberal. Looking at 
the inter-war period as a whole, only in the Montrose District was there any tradition 
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of Liberal representation in the inter-war period, with victories for that party in 1923, 
1924 and 1929. Overall, the six post-1918 Burgh Districts were another repository of 
support for the Labour Party over the inter-war period. Aside from the Ayr and 
Montrose Districts, which never returned a Labour MP between the wars, Labour 
found these new seats relatively happy hunting grounds. Dumbarton (David 
Kirkwood) and Dunfermline were held by Labour MPs at each election from 1922 to 
1935. In the cases of Kirkcaldy, and Stirling and Falkirk, there were four elections at 
which Labour MPs were returned, one of the exceptions being the special case of 
1931.35 In some ways, the abolition of the pre-1918 Districts was the most 
controversial result of the redistribution in the 1918 Reform Act, and its deserves to 
be discussed in more depth. 
 
The general tone of historical discussion about the 1918 Reform Act has been 
dominated by its apparent democratisation of the UK’s electoral system and, where 
caveats have been noted, they are largely centred on the failure to abolish plural 
voting, introduce proportional representation or a fully gender-equal franchise.36 
These points are valid if the act is to be tested against the measure of a fully 
democratic system, and they were voiced at the time. One northern newspaper with 
a radical Liberal tradition noted at an early point in the process that, although the 
scheme was a ‘step forward’, the reforms meant that ‘we are still a long way from 
giving every adult British citizen a vote without reference to residence or property 
qualification’.37  There were other worries hidden in the debate over the bill in its 
Scottish context and many of them can be explored through discussion of the 
abolition of the Districts of Burghs. The defenders of these seats were, of course, 
trying to protect their own interests, but the arguments that they used tell us much 
 
16 
about Scottish political culture in the early-twentieth century and at a time of great 
change. The first argument that was used was that these were very old seats and 
represented a continuity to pre-Union Scotland and, therefore, to something 
genuinely ‘Scottish’. This was not a period in which there was a particular 
romanticisation of Scotland’s political system before 1707; indeed, academic 
historiography tended to be rather dismissive of the Scottish Parliament and other 
institutions, regarding them as corrupt, unsophisticated and dominated by the 
aristocracy.38 Outside this body of literature there may have been a greater affection 
for an older Scotland. The Town Clerk of Kirkcaldy in Fife, resisting the addition of 
Methil and Buckhaven (which contained large numbers of working-class voters, 
especially coal miners), argued that the extant Kirkcaldy District had survived 
unchanged since 1707.39 A similar point was made in the south of Scotland, where 
the Dumfries and Border Burghs were facing oblivion, and one local newspaper 
noted that the representation of the smaller towns of Scotland had been a central 
feature of the pre-Union system in that one of the ‘estates’ of the unicameral Scottish 
parliament were the Burgh and Shire Commissioners.40 
 
If one argument used against the break-up of burgh districts was based on history, 
another was predicated on economics. The Boundary Commissioners were enjoined 
to keep industrial and agricultural areas separate in their work on county 
constituencies, but the diversity of economic interests in the burghs made this more 
difficult to use as a basis for reorganisation. Nevertheless, it was resorted to by those 
who defended threatened districts. In Fife, for example, in the Kirkcaldy burghs there 
was an argument about the extent to which the mining areas of Buckhaven and 
Methil, which had ‘special and peculiar problems’, according to Kirkcaldy Town 
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Council, would change the nature of the seat. In a similar argument the Town Clerk 
of Dunfermline objected to his burgh being grouped with Cowdenbeath and 
Lochgelly, both dominated by coal mining, and thought that the textile and service 
town of Dunfermline would be better grouped with the neighbouring and growing 
town of Rosyth.41 In the event the new seat was constituted as Dunfermline, 
Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly. There was an interesting three-sided contest there in 
1918, which was won by a Coalition Liberal candidate, but in 1922 a two-sided 
contest saw a victory for the Labour candidate and he held the seat until 1945.42 In 
the north east of Scotland an argument was made by the ‘leading citizens of 
Fraserburgh’ that there should be a new District created composed of fishing ports 
from Peterhead to Buckie around the Aberdeenshire and Banffshire coast. No such 
seat was created.43 Thus the antiquity and local identity of these seats was deployed 
in an attempt to retain their presence in the new Scottish electoral system after 1832. 
 
If history was one argument that was used to defend the District of Burghs seats 
another was related to the perceived modernity of the immediate post-war moment. 
Several MPs argued that this was a time of unprecedented change and that to 
introduce a new system before the demographic and social effects of the war were 
clear would be a mistake. As was noted above, local politicians in Dunfermline 
argued that a combination of that town and Rosyth, its massively-expanded 
neighbouring naval base and dockyard, would make more sense than hitching 
Dunfermline to two mining towns. A similar argument was made with reference to 
Gretna in the south west of Scotland during the discussion on the Dumfries Burghs.44 
In both these cases there had been massive expansion in the war years. Gretna was 
the site of a huge explosives factory which employed thousands of women during the 
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war years. Rosyth was a rapidly developing new town on the garden city principle as 
the local authority and the Admiralty sought to house the population associated with 
the naval base and dockyard. George Younger worried that it would be a mistake to 
‘wipe out’ the Dumfries Burghs when a perfectly good constituency could be created 
in Gretna and Annan, especially after the government had spent massively to build 
up the factory.45 The MP for Dunfermline, the pacifist Arthur Ponsonby (who lost the 
new seat in the 1918 general election), supported Younger in arguing that Rosyth 
was a special case and that the 1914 level of population was quite the wrong 
baseline to use, as the town had expanded so much since then and was likely to 
continue to grow.46 
 
In the  north of Scotland, the reaction against the changes embodied in the 1917 Bill, 
and largely enacted in 1918, was very marked indeed. The electoral history of the 
Highlands was quite striking. The expansion of the electorate there had been very 
considerable in 1885, and the political results were almost unique in a British context 
in that the new electors used their new rights to reject the traditional parties and elect 
a series of ‘Crofter’ MPs at the elections of 1885 and 1886.47 Although these were 
either neutered and drawn back into the Liberal fold or defeated in the elections of 
the 1890s, the tradition of apparent radicalism was quite strong and was reasserted 
from 1906. In the 1910 and 1918 elections, there were candidates in Argyll, 
Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, and the Western Isles under the banner of the 
‘Highland Land League’, a reference to the politics of the 1880s. None of them made 
much impact but their presence is worth noting. Although the new seat of the 
Western Isles was created out of insular parts of Ross-shire and Inverness-shire, the 
Highlands lost three other seats due to the absorbtion of theInverness and Wick 
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Districts of Burghs into their s urrounding county seats, and the amalgamation of 
Caithness and Sutherland into a single seat: the latter was a long-standing proposal 
which had been headed off in 1868.48  
 
Radical opinion in the Highlands was confident that the new seats would still return 
Liberal MPs, and this did turn out to be the case in the inter-war period, although the 
Western Isles elected a Labour MP in 1935.49 It was noted that seats like Inverness-
shire were vast in area and the difficulties which candidates faced due to the 
‘absence of the means of easy communication, and to the mountainous ranges and 
stormy seas that divide one district from another, and make travel slow and tedious.’ 
This was especially relevant when the proposal that the election be held within eight 
days of the nomination of the candidates is taken into consideration.50 The lack of 
community of interest between Caithness and Sutherland was noted, they were 
deemed to be as different as a Welsh and an English county in ‘race, language, 
traditions, customs, sentiments’.51 A variety of themes in Highland history were 
mobilised in opposition to these proposals on the assumption that in this, as in so 
many other areas of politics and policy, there was a case for special treatment for the 
region.52 Far from being seen as a democratising influence, the redistribution was 
seen as an attack on the Highlands for which the government had no mandate; this 
was seen as especially grievous when so many men from the Highlands were 
fighting ‘to preserve our freedom’. Opponents of the scheme thought that the 
government was unduly distracted from the more important task of winning the war 
and that the redistribution was inappropriate and manipulative.53 Newspapers across 
the political spectrum noted that the context of Highland depopulation ought to be 
considered if that was the basis on which its representation was to be reduced. 
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Highland towns were small because of ‘misgovernment since the days of the “Forty-
Five”’ and 
 
Depopulation started with the butchery of the Highlanders at Culloden by 
hired Germans. Then a foreign land system was thrust upon us … In a couple 
of generations it culminated in the Clearances, and if it has eased off since it 
is only because there are fewer victims left. It is not the existing population 
that ought to be the basis of representation in the Highlands but the latent or 
potential population. Because of what the Highlands has suffered, and is 
suffering, we ought not to have our voice stifled; we ought to have a larger 
say.54 
 
Another newspaper argued that the Highlands were not being treated in a manner 
consistent with Ireland. Irish over-representation was seen as the result of an 
unwillingness to punish the Irish people for the mistakes of historil British policy in 
Ireland, and that there were grounds for dealing with the Highlands in a similar 
manner.55 In a variant of the argument used in the discussions over Rosyth and 
Gretna, the Highland land Settlement Association wrote to the Speaker of the House 
of Commons arguing that the current population levels in the Highlands would likely 
be altered very significantly by the process of land settlement and the demands of 
food production, both of which would repopulate the north of Scotland.56 The strong 
levels of recruiting allegedly evident in the Highlands was also used to argue against 
the proposed redistribution. As campaigners against the amalgamation of Caithness 
and Sutherland argued: ‘The government took the men away to fight for the Empire 
and now they want to blot us out as a separate constituency’.57 This was also a point 
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made by Alpheus C. Morton, the MP for Sutherland; in a letter to the Boundary 
Commissioners in August 1917, he contrasted the ‘loyal and remarkable’ wartime 
service of the people of Sutherland with their ‘harsh’ treatment by the Boundary 
Commissioners.58 It is perhaps not surprising that we should find opposition to 
redistribution in an area, such as the Highlands, which stood to lose seats from the 
process. The depth of the opposition and the range of arguments that were deployed 
in the interests defending the seats slated for abolition is quite striking and provides 
evidence that this apparently democratising moment was not always seen as such. 
 
The other areas of Scotland that stood to lose from the redistribution, to an even 
greater extent than the Highlands in fact, was the Borders and the south west. In this 
case the Border Burghs and the Dumfries Burghs were under threat, whilst the 
number of county seats was to be reduced to three – Galloway, Dumfries, and a 
single constituency of Roxburgh and Selkirk. Berwickshire was to be part of a new 
seat with Haddington, and Peebles was to be merged with South Midlothian, another 
mining constituency. This was very unpopular across southern Scotland.59 The 
principal issue that was debated in this case was the awkward marriages of counties 
and burghs with different industrial structures and socio-economic backgrounds.  As 
in the Highlands, there was a feeling that the redistribution would give too much 
power to the industrial areas of Scotland and to Glasgow, and the inclusion of the 
Burghs in the county seats would mean that the constituencies in the south of 
Scotland would no longer be ones in which ‘agriculture is the paramount interest’. It 
was also pointed out that the new Galloway constituency would be large, stretching 
80 miles east to west from the River Nith to the Irish Sea and about 65 miles, from 
south to north, from the Solway Firth to the borders of Ayrshire. Even compared to 
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the Highlands, which were relatively well penetrated by railways, this was an area 
with poor communications facilities and would be very difficult for an MP to 
represent.60 In response to these difficulties local political representatives tried to 
create a scheme for combining the two Burgh seats to produce a constituency of 
more than 70,000 population. This was controversial in Selkirk Town Council as 
some Bailies argued that there was little community of interest between the 
agricultural service centres in the Dumfries District and the textile industries in the 
Hawick District and that this proposal would not result in a rational constituency.61 
The Town Councils of Hawick, Selkirk and Galashiels were hostile to this scheme 
and it went no further.62 There were wider questions raised about the possibility of an 
MP representing a constituency which combined agriculture and industry. One 
newspaper questioned the desirability  
 
of placing upon one man the duty of attempting to represent adequately and 
efficiently such widely differing interests. The factory and the farm hold equally 
important positions in the internal economy of the district and both are entitled 
to send to parliament men whom they believe will best represent them 
respectively. 63 
 
Indeed, in the case of divided counties the Boundary Commissioners had been 
enjoined to separate industrial and farming areas.64 As in the Highlands, there were 
criticisms of the government for introducing such a wide-ranging scheme of 
redistribution without an electoral mandate and at a time ‘when the public mind is on 




A group of MPs from the south of Scotland combined to write to the Boundary 
Commissioners to argue against the scheme of redistribution. They referred to the 
long distances involved in representing constituencies of sparse population and 
argued that the new constituencies would make these problems much worse. They 
explicitly compared their area of Scotland with the Highlands, which, they argued, 
had been treated much more leniently. In their view this was contrary to the 
instructions given to the Boundary Commissioners to avoid the creation of 
constituencies ‘inconvenient in size or character’.66 The Boundary Commissioners 
prepared two memoranda in response to this letter. They noted that the MPs defined 
the Highlands as stretching from Shetland and Orkney in the north to Argyll in the 
South and encompassed six seats. These seats had an average population of 
50,842 compared to the seats in the south of Scotland, stretching from Berwickshire 
in the east to the new seat of Galloway in the south west, with an average population 
of 68,666. On this basis John Barran and his colleagues appeared to have a point, 
although there were only four persons per 100 acres in the Highlands, compared to 
ten persons in the south. The Commissioners then took a slightly disingenuous line 
of argument. They added Perthshire and Kincardineshire, Moray and Nairn, Banff, 
Aberdeenshire and Kincardineshire and, particularly unconvincingly, the City of 
Aberdeen. This allowed them to build a comparison between the south of Scotland 
and the ‘Highland and Northern Counties as a whole’. This brought the average 
populations per seat closer together: 68,666 in the south and 59,648 in the north. 
This was deemed to be a ‘not undue disparity … when all the relevant circumstances 
are taken into account’ and they went on to argue that ‘absolute equality of 
population – even if desirable – is unattainable under any scheme of parliamentary 
representation which has regard to existing administrative areas’. It was further 
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noted that the constituencies in the Highlands were much further from Westminster 
and the internal communications were ‘incomparably more difficult’ in the north. 
These were, of course, arguments used by Highland MPs to argue against the 
redistribution.67 The difference in tone between the arguments used by 
representatives of the south of Scotland compared to the Highlands is quite striking. 
The emotional and historical arguments used by the Highlanders was of a piece with 
the tone of debate about the region since the 1880s. Nevertheless, when comparing 
the two cases, the evidence of the Boundary Commissioners’ response to the former 
suggests that it was broadly geographical and demographic arguments and 
recognition of the difficulty of travelling and communicating in the large Highland 
seats that were crucial in securing the relatively greater representation of the 
Highlands compared to the south of Scotland. 
 
This article has attempted to show that the redistribution inherent in the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 had an important effect on the Scottish 
political landscape. The effect of these changes on the electoral map of Scotland 
requires some comment in conclusion. Many of the features of that landscape, which 
had helped to sustain Liberal domination of Scottish politics since 1832 were swept 
away. Alongside important social and economic changes and the extension of the 
electorate a new landscape was formed that provided territory across which the 
Labour and Scottish Unionist Parties could stride. The Liberal party declined as an 
electoral force but its legacy survived in a number of aspects of post-war Scotland. 
The progressive Unionism which was such a feature of the Scottish scene in the 
1920s and 1930s owed more than a little to elements of Liberalism from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Labour Party, which broke through into 
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the mainstream of Scottish politics in 1922, can be seen as an outgrowth of radical 
Liberalism, rather than an alternative to it. Towards the end of the decade Scottish 
nationalism began to emerge in partisan form. Although it was not until the Second 
World War that it had any electoral effect, its central demand for Scottish home rule 
was one which would have been recognisable to Liberals who had been involved in 
the Young Scots Society (and who were involved in the debates reviewed in this 
article), or to a slightly older generation who had founded the Scottish Home Rule 
Association in the 1880s. Nevertheless, the novel elements of the political system of 
the 1920s should not be denied. New forms of politics were required in order to 
appeal to a truly mass electorate, organised into constituencies of a type quite 
different from those which date from the redistribution of the 1880s. The electoral 
geography of Scotland caught up, at last it might be said, with the demographic 
geography of the nation. The urban-industrial western region punched its weight and 
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